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The Deªnition of “Gender” in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court:
A Step Forward or Back for
International Criminal Justice?
Valerie Oosterveld*
In 1998, the term “gender” was used and deªned for the ªrst time in an
international criminal law treaty, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).1 Will the deªnition help or hinder the ICC in its work?
More generally, does the deªnition advance, or narrow, the way international
law understands “gender”? The use of the term “gender” in the Rome Statute is generally viewed as positive for international criminal law, as it mirrors the increasingly common use of the term in international human rights
law over the past decade. However, opinions vary widely about the deªnition of “gender” adopted in the Rome Statute, and include some sharp criticism. Some describe it as “stunningly narrow,”2 a “failure,”3 “puzzling and

* Legal Ofªcer, United Nations, Human Rights and Economic Law Division, Foreign Affairs Canada.
Ms. Oosterveld was a member of the Canadian delegation to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC). She focused
on gender-related issues and was involved in the formal, informal, and corridor negotiations on the
deªnition of “gender.” Ms. Oosterveld also served on the Canadian delegation to the subsequent ICC
Preparatory Commission and the Assembly of States Parties. This Article was written in partial
fulªllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University. The views expressed in this Article are the author’s own and are not necessarily the
views of the Government of Canada. The author would like to thank Kristen Boon, Doris Buss, and
Debra Livingston for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The deªnition is found in article 7(3).
2. Brenda Cossman, Gender Performance, Sexual Subjects and International Law, 15 Can. J.L. & Juris.
281, 283 (2002). Stephanie Farrior has similarly described the deªnition as “limiting.” Stephanie Farrior,
The Rights of Women in International Human Rights Law Textbooks: Segregation, Integration, or Omission?, 12
Colum. J. Gender & L. 587, 589 (2003).
3. Brook Sari Moshan, Women, War and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent International
Criminal Court’s Deªnition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 154, 178 (1998).
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bizarre,”4 “peculiar,”5 “restraining,”6 and having “limited transformative edge.”7
Others claim that it wrongfully “elides the notions of ‘gender’ and ‘sex,’”8
making “gender” mean the same as biological “sex” and therefore not recognizing that “gender is a constructed and contingent set of assumptions about
female and male roles.”9 One United Nations Special Rapporteur describes
the deªnition as “prevent[ing] approaches that rely on the social construction of gender.”10 Some commentators view the deªnition more positively,
characterizing it as “consistent with other, more clearly stated formulations”
adopted within the United Nations.11
The strongly negative reactions are not surprising. Article 7(3) of the
Rome Statute provides the following deªnition of “gender”: “For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does
not indicate any meaning different from the above.”12 This oddly worded
and circular provision emerged from difªcult and highly contentious negotiations in which the term “gender” served as a lightning rod for conservative
concerns about sexuality, unlike other terms such as “political,” “racial,” “na4. Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly D. Askin, International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court
Statute: Crimes Against Women, in 2 Women and International Human Rights Law 3, 20 n.73
(Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000). Askin notes that, at a roundtable discussion, Professor
Theo van Boven described the deªnition as “the most puzzling and bizarre language ever included in an
international treaty.”
5. Id. at 20; see also Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into
International Criminal Law, 46 McGill L.J. 217, 236 (2000) (describing the deªnition as “peculiar and
circular,” albeit from a more positive point of view).
6. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 317, 340 (2002).
7. Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A
Feminist Analysis 335 (2000).
8. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 379, 394 (1999)
[hereinafter Charlesworth, Feminist Methods]. See also Ruth B. Philips, Too Close to Home?: International
Criminal Law, War Crimes and Family Violence, 24 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 229, 233 n.14 (2002).
9. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394.
10. Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes, and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy,
Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/45, Violence Against Women Perpetrated and/or Condoned by the State During Times of Armed Conºict (1997–2000), U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., 57th Sess., Agenda Item 12(a), ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (2001) [hereinafter Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women].
11. Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed
Conºict, Update to the Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, U.N ESCOR,
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Agenda
Item 6, ¶ 26, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/21(2000) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery]. See also Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall Martinez, Ending Impunity for
Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 Brown J. World Aff. 65 (1999), available at
http://www.crlp.org/pub_art_icc.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005); Barbara Bedont, Gender-Speciªc Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1 Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 183, 187 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Bedont, Gender-Speciªc Provisions]; Copelon, supra note 5, at 237; Machteld Boot, III. Paragraph 3:
Deªnition of Gender, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article 171, 172 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(3).
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tional,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” “religious,” “age,” “wealth,” and “birth” included
in the broad lists of prohibited grounds of persecution and discrimination.13
The deªnition sharply reºected the use of “constructive ambiguity” by the
negotiators.14 The critics are concerned because the word “gender” occurs
nine times in the Rome Statute, in key articles on crimes against humanity,15 applicable law,16 the ofªce of the Prosecutor,17 the duties and powers of
the Prosecutor with respect to investigations,18 and the protection of victims
and witnesses as well as their participation in proceedings.19 How the ICC
interprets “gender” will have a direct impact on the kinds of cases of persecution that the Court may be able to prosecute, as well as on the law applied, on
how the Prosecutor undertakes his/her duties, and on the protection and participation of victims and witnesses. It could also profoundly affect the legal
construction of “gender” under international law.
This Article begins with an examination of the negotiation process that
led to the adoption of the deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute, in
which the author took an active part. Part II then surveys deªnitions of
“gender” used by the United Nations in the areas of international human
rights and refugee law. Part III examines four concerns raised by commentators regarding the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender.” The ªrst concern is
that the direct linkage in the deªnition of the term “gender” with the term
“sex” seems to conºate the two. Some commentators fear that the ICC deªnition equates “gender” with biologically determined “sex,” thereby eliminating the understanding that “gender” is a social construct. The second concern is
that the phrase “within the context of society” diverges from references to
socially constructed roles found in United Nations documents. The U.N.
deªnitions are more detailed and tend to interpret social construction
broadly to include an examination of attitudes, values, responsibilities, opportunities, and relationships between and among women and men, while
acknowledging the inºuence of culture, political and economic context, class,
race, ethnicity, poverty level, sexual orientation, and age. The ICC’s stark
reference to “context of society” therefore raises the question whether the
ICC has a much more limited understanding of social construction. The
third concern is that the negotiating history and the statement “the term
‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above” could be
interpreted to exclude sexual orientation from falling within the deªnition
of “gender.” Such a construction would thereby eliminate persecution conducted on the basis of sexual orientation as a crime against humanity, per13. Id. arts. 7(1)(h), 21(3).
14. “Constructive ambiguity” is a term used in diplomacy to refer to the use of ambiguous words that
give comfort to those on different sides of a debate, thereby promoting agreement.
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7(1)(h), 7(3).
16. Id. art. 21(3).
17. Id. art. 42(9).
18. Id. art. 54(1)(b).
19. Id. art. 68(1).
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mitting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the ICC’s interpretation and application of law, and excluding the ICC from considering
sexual orientation when addressing the needs of victims and witnesses. The
ªnal concern stems from the fact that “gender” is the only term deªned in
the context of the crime against humanity of persecution. Some commentators thus fear that the singling out of “gender” for deªnition, and the lack of
clarity in that deªnition, will leave the ICC in a weaker position to prosecute and convict gender-based persecution as compared to other forms of
persecution.
This Article concludes in Part IV by arguing that the critics are overly
harsh. Admittedly, the drafters missed a key opportunity to adopt a clear
and visionary approach to “gender” in the text of the Rome Statute. However, the critics have overlooked the fact that there were few better alternatives likely to emerge from the negotiations. More importantly, they have
not recognized that by resorting to the use of “constructive ambiguity,” the
drafters did leave open opportunities for a positive and precedent-setting
approach—an opportunity that should be seized upon by lawyers and the
ICC itself. Those interpreting “gender” should be guided by key signals in
the Rome Statute and international law indicating that “gender” is to be
understood broadly as a multifaceted, complex, and socially constructed category. In addition, those interpreting “gender” should refer to international
legal theory on gender-sensitivity. Given that there has been relatively little
focus to date on the content of the term “gender” in international legal theory, increased theorization can also play a central role in ensuring productive
and sensitive interpretations of the term by the ICC. With interpretive assistance from the Rome Statute, United Nations practice, international law,
and international legal theory, the deªnition of “gender” included in the
Rome Statute will help rather than hinder the ICC in its work, and consequently will assist in advancing the understanding of “gender” in international law.
I. Including “Gender” in the Rome Statute:
The Negotiation History
Unlike the ªnal version of the 1998 Rome Statute, which refers to “gender” nine times, the 1994 draft Statute for an International Criminal Court
by the International Law Commission (“ILC”) did not contain the word
“gender.”20 The ªnal text was the result of a strong lobbying effort by nongovernmental organizations21 and of recognition among many delegations
that the Statute needed to be gender-sensitive if the ICC was to comprehen20. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 20, at 70–73, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994). See also Rome Statute, supra
note 1, arts. 7(1)(b), 7(3), 21, 42(9), 54(1)(b), 68(1).
21. Especially the coalition of nongovernmental organizations known as the Women’s Caucus for
Gender Justice.
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sively address genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Use of the
term “gender” was ªrst proposed in 1996 when several states recommended
adding a reference to gender balance to the ILC’s article on the qualiªcations
and election of judges.22 In February 1997, the term “gender” was included
in brackets23 in the crime against humanity of persecution as a speciªcally
prohibited ground of persecution,24 echoing recent advances in international
refugee law.25 Five more references to “gender” were added to the draft ICC
Statute in the August 1997 Preparatory Committee negotiations. Two of
these references were included in a provision calling on the Prosecutor to
take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes, while also respecting, inter alia, the gender of victims and
witnesses and taking into account whether the crime involved sexual or gender
violence.26 Similar references were added into a provision stating that the
Prosecutor must take appropriate measures to protect victims and witnesses,
“having regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and
the nature of the crime, in particular whether the crime involves sexual or
gender violence.”27 Another provision stated that the “Court shall take such
measures as are necessary to ensure the safety, physical and psychological well-

22. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. II
(Compilation of Proposals), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 11, 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
See also Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During March-April and August 1996), U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp.
No. 22, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
23. In international negotiations, the use of square brackets indicates text that has not been accepted
by consensus.
24. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 11 to 21 February 1997, U.N.
GAOR, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, 51st mtg., Annex 1, at 4, 5
n.7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (1997). “Gender” was bracketed as part of the debate on whether to
include an illustrative (open-ended) list of prohibited grounds for persecution, or an exhaustive (closed)
list. Some countries supported a short illustrative list without “gender” because additional grounds could
be “read in” by the ICC’s judges on a case-by-case basis. Certain other countries argued for an exhaustive
list taken from the Charters and Statutes of previous international criminal tribunals (which did not
include “gender”). See Darryl Robinson, Deªning “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 Am.
J. Int’l L. 43, 53–54 (1999); e-mail from Darryl Robinson, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada, to
Valerie Oosterveld, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada (Feb. 18, 2004) (on ªle with author).
25. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees EXCOM had issued Conclusion No. 39
(XXXVI), which recognized that states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed
the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a “particular social group” within
the meaning of article 1(a)(2) of the Refugee Convention. Conclusion No. 39 (XXXVI) on Refugee Women
and International Protection, Executive Comm. of the United Nations High Comm’n for Refugees, ¶¶ (b),
(k), U.N. Doc. HRC/IP/2 (1985). In addition, the UNHCR had issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, Ofªce of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (1991) and U.N. High
Comm’n for Refugees, Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and
Response (1995). Several countries had also recognized, through policy or legislation, that gender-based
persecution is a valid ground for claiming refugee status. See Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and
Refugee Status 3 (2000).
26. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held from 4 to 15 August 1997, U.N.
GAOR, Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Annex 2, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1 (1997).
27. Id. art. 43(2).
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being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses, at all stages of the process, including, but not limited to, victims and witnesses of sexual and gender
violence.”28 This last provision gained wide acceptance and was not bracketed,
while the previous provisions were bracketed because delegates debated whether
the text should make separate mention of the Prosecutor’s role in protecting
victims and witnesses.29
At the December 1997 negotiations, a proposal was made to include a provision stating that the ICC’s application and interpretation of general sources
of law must be consistent with, among other things, norms of nondiscrimination based on gender.30 Support for this idea grew, and the March 1998
draft incorporated the idea in an unbracketed article.31 During the March
1998 negotiations, the Preparatory Committee also adopted a provision, ultimately bracketed, compelling the Prosecutor to appoint advisers with legal
expertise on sexual and gender violence.32 The issue of the qualiªcations of
judges originally raised in 1996 was revisited,33 and draft text was included
in brackets stating that those selecting the ICC’s judges should consider in
their selection gender balance and the need for “expertise on issues related to
sexual and gender violence, violence against children and other similar matters.”34 The delegates also agreed that the staff of the Court should be selected with regard to similar criteria.35
Going into the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there appeared to be partial
agreement on the use of the term “gender” in the Statute, with two provisions
containing the term accepted by consensus and a number of others bracketed
and therefore open to debate.36 Negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference

28. Id. art. 43(3).
29. At this time, no state questioned (at least publicly) the use of the term “gender” in these provisions.
30. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at Its Session Held 1 to 12 December 1997, U.N. GAOR,
Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Annex 2, at 14 n.11, U.N.
Doc.A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997).
31. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Draft Statute and Draft Final Act), U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, at art. 20(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee]. However, certain conservative states
asked, in corridor discussions, why this article did not refer to non-discrimination on the basis of sex.
32. Id. art. 43(9).
33. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Vol. II
(Compilation of Proposals), supra note 22.
34. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 43(9). For a description of
opposition to these references, see Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in The International Criminal Court:
The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations, Results 357, 377–80 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999).
35. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 45(2). This was done
through a cross reference to article 37(8).
36. Id. The provisions accepted by consensus were articles 20(3) on applicable law and 68(3) on measures the Court shall take with respect to victims. The bracketed provisions were the Crimes Against
Humanity article, article 37(8)(e) on gender balance among judges and judicial qualiªcations, article
43(9) on a Prosecutor-appointed gender adviser, article 54(4)(e) on Prosecutorial investigations, and
article 68(2) on measures the Prosecutor shall take with respect to victims.
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began smoothly, with the adoption of a provision stating that the “Prosecutor
shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on speciªc issues, including, but
not limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against children.”37
However, opposition to the use of “gender” soon arose in the negotiations
relating to the qualiªcations of judges.38 At the same time as countries questioned the references to “gender” in the provision on judicial qualiª-cations,39
conservative nongovernmental organizations distributed lobby papers calling
for the deletion of both “gender balance” and the reference to judicial expertise in sexual and gender violence.40
After a long negotiation process, delegates ultimately chose to resolve the
impasse by removing the term “gender” from the judicial provisions. While
37. Agreement was reached in the informal negotiations of the Working Group on Composition and
Administration of the Court on June 29, 1998. Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation
to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court, Notes From Informals of the Working Group on Composition and Administration of
the Court, June 29, 1998 (on ªle with author). The provision was adopted by the Committee of the
Whole and sent to the Drafting Committee on July 4, 1998. Recommendations of the Coordinator: Part 4,
Composition and Administration of the Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.45
(1998).
38. In initial public discussions of the issue, the delegate from Syria stated that the paragraph providing for judges with expertise “on issues related to sexual and gender violence” was unacceptable: “he
knew of no specialty called ‘gender violence.’” Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 14th
mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.14 (1998) [hereinafter Comm. of the
Whole, Summary Record of the 14th Meeting]. Iran argued that reference to “gender balance” could give rise
to difªculties of understanding and interpretation, and that the reference to judicial expertise in sexual
and gender violence might be expanded, for example to include expertise in the crime of torture. Summary Record of the 15th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 15th mtg., Agenda Item 11, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/
C.1/SR.15 (1998) [hereinafter Comm. of the Whole, Summary Record of the 15th Meeting]. Some states
opposed to the use of “gender” expressed concern in corridor discussions that their judges would not be
considered to have expertise in gender-based violence because such violence was traditionally dealt with
outside of the criminal justice system. Countries from all regions also spoke publicly in favor of retaining
the references to “gender balance” or judicial expertise in sexual and gender violence. See Comm. of the
Whole, Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, supra (for comments from the United States, Nigeria, Colombia, New Zealand, Sweden, Afghanistan, Senegal); Comm. of the Whole, Summary Record of the 15th
Meeting, supra (for comments from Oman, Canada, Australia, Thailand, Libya, Brunei Darussalam, Iraq,
Burundi, Ghana, Costa Rica, and Finland).
39. See Steains, supra note 34, at 381 n.80 for a list of countries that spoke in favor. For those that
called for deletion, see id. at 381 n.81.
40. For example, a paper prepared by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies stated:
some groups espouse the vague concept of “gender sensitivity” as a litmus test in the judicial
selection process. While consideration of the needs of women and children in the judicial selection process is appropriate, use of the undeªned (and readily expansive) concept of “gender sensitivity” is problematic, and could be used by some special interest groups to undermine traditional moral, cultural and religious values.
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Impartiality in the Election of Judges, at http://www.
worldfamilypolicycenter.org/wfpc/About_the_WFPC/papers/icc_report.html#AppH1 (last visited Jan.
12, 2005). In an untitled paper, REAL Women of Canada argued that the word “gender” is used by
special interest groups to capture the idea that men and women’s roles are socially constructed, and that
the term can be used to establish or advance “rights” based on sexual conduct or sexual orientation: “On
n’a jamais déªni le mot ‘gender’ précisément [The word ‘gender’ was never precisely deªned].” (on ªle
with author).
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many countries wished to retain the reference to “gender” in “gender balance” because it followed the precedent set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action,41 the delegates agreed to change the reference to
“female and male.”42 Negotiations on whether some judges should have expertise on issues relating to sexual and gender violence led to a similar result,
with the ªnal text simply referring to expertise “on speciªc issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children.”43 Those who
had supported the retention of the reference to “gender” were comforted by
the fact that the list describing expertise is illustrative rather than exhaustive and that expertise on violence against women or children overlaps to
some extent (though not entirely) with expertise on gender issues.
While two references to “gender” were removed to resolve the disagreement on judicial qualiªcations, many states felt strongly that this was not a
viable solution for other references to “gender” in the Statute. Supporters felt
that the remaining references to “gender” had to be retained. Debate about
whether to remove the term from the provision on persecution was set aside
for later discussion,44 and the focus shifted to the applicable law provision,
the forum in which the issue was resolved.45 This provision sets out the law
to be applied by the Court and concludes with a “no adverse distinction”
clause, the draft of which initially read: “The application and interpretation
of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, which include the prohibition of adverse distinction
founded on gender” and other grounds.46 While the text of this paragraph
was agreed upon at the March 1998 Preparatory Committee negotiations,

41. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1 Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/REV.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13
(1996) [hereinafter Beijing Platform for Action].
42. In fact, since the meaning here related to biological sex, it made sense to change it for terminological clarity, despite the Beijing Platform for Action’s language of gender balance. Charlesworth makes
“a plea for greater terminological awareness,” so “gender” is not used where “sex” is the appropriate term,
and vice-versa. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Gender of International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 93 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 206 (1999) [hereinafter Charlesworth, Proceedings].
43. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(8).
44. This was done by ºagging the term with a footnote stating that “gender” “refers to male or female.” Article 5, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–17, 1998, at 2 n.2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.44 (1998). This was not an agreed-upon deªnition; it was simply a placeholder for
later debate. Dissenting states were concerned that their male nationals could be charged with crimes
against humanity because of traditional gender-based practices and criminalization of homosexuality. For
example, Azerbaijan asked if the persecution provision could “imply that a conviction by a national court
for homosexual acts might be regarded as persecution and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the Court as
a crime against humanity?” Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 25th mtg., Agenda Item
11, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.25 (2002).
45. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3), formerly 20(3), during the negotiations. While the
deªnition of “gender” was debated in this forum, debates on retaining or deleting the term still took
place in negotiations on other articles. See Steains, supra note 34, at 386–89.
46. 1998 Draft Statute Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 31, art. 20(3).
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several countries now argued that the term “gender” should be deleted from
the list of enumerated grounds or that the clause should end at “internationally recognized human rights.”47 This led to a polarized debate, with many
countries expressing their support for, or opposition to, retaining the term
“gender.”48 The opposition argued that the term “gender” could imply rights
more expansive than those currently recognized in many states, with the
main concern being that the term might sanction rights based on sexual orientation.49 Some also argued that “gender” could not be adequately translated
into all six ofªcial U.N. languages.50 Conservative nongovernmental organizations distributed lobby papers making similar (but more detailed) arguments.51
After it became clear that the debate had come to an impasse on the term
“gender,” the Chair of the Working Group on Applicable Law asked if the
solution used at the 1995 World Conference on Women could resolve the
difference of opinion. In that case, the President of the World Conference
had made a statement on the commonly understood meaning of the term “gender” and an annex containing this statement was included in the conference
report.52 Many delegations felt this was an acceptable solution, but those op-

47. Steains, supra note 34, at 372.
48. For example, on July 11 and 13, 1998, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa,
Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United States argued in favor of retaining the term “gender,”
while Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Guatemala, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen called for the elimination of the term “gender.”
Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Notes From Working Group
on Applicable Law, July 11, 13, 1998 (on ªle with author).
49. Steains, supra note 34, at 372. The concern that the term might also recognize women’s human
rights not recognized domestically was also implicit in some statements.
50. This argument, which is commonly made at the United Nations with respect to the term “gender,” was also made in Rome. Oosterveld, supra note 48.
51. For example, a position paper prepared by the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies
raises several concerns:
If “gender,” as used in the ICC Draft Statute, in fact means something beyond “male” and “female,” the ICC will drastically restructure societies throughout the world. The possibilities include everything from hiring quotas to sexual orientation to abortion—hardly an appropriate
agenda for a “criminal” court. The ICC was never intended, nor should it be used, to redeªne
and regulate all ‘socially constructed roles’ that exist throughout the globe. Remember: in the
Arabic and French texts, the word gender is never used; instead the Arabic and French texts refer to “the two sexes.”
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, What’s the Argument for “Gender Justice?” (unpublished position paper, undated) (on ªle with author).
52. Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995,
Addendum, Annex IV, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1996) [hereinafter
Beijing Conference Addendum]. This statement notes that a contact group was formed to examine the
meaning of the word “gender” and concluded “(1) the word ‘gender’ had been commonly used and understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage in numerous other United Nations forums and conferences; (2) there was no indication that any new meaning or connotation of the term, different from accepted prior usage, was intended in the Platform for Action” and reafªrmed “that the word ‘gender’ as
used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted and understood as it was in ordinary,
generally accepted usage.” Id.
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posed to the use of the term argued that the Beijing solution was too vague
as it did not actually deªne “gender,” and such a “non-deªnition” would violate
the requirement of certainty in criminal law.53 In bilateral and corridor discussions, those opposed insisted that adoption of a suitable deªnition was
the only way in which the term could remain.
Negotiations then shifted to drafting a deªnition that could be accepted
by all countries, and a series of proposals were considered informally.54 Countries opposed to the use of the term “gender” indicated that they would only
consider a deªnition that referred to “men, women and children” or “the two
sexes, male and female.”55 Countries supporting use of the term were committed to ensuring that any deªnition adopted would reºect that “gender”
refers to socially constructed understandings of what it means to be male or
female. Positive (what “gender” means) and negative (what “gender” does
not mean) approaches were considered by both sides, and the positive approach was deemed to be more acceptable. In accordance with the nature of
the negotiations,56 those supportive of retaining the term made proposals
referring to both “male and female” and socially constructed roles, such as:
“men and women and their roles in society,” “being a male or female and its
[associated] implications in society,” “men and women and their functions in
society,” “males and females within society,” and “males and females in the
context of society.”57 Those opposed to the term insisted on reference to “two
sexes” and agreed on the inclusion of a reference to “society,” proposing: “For
the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to
the two sexes, male and female, [and their roles] within society [in the context of society]. The term does not imply the existence of more than two
sexes.”58 Those supportive of retaining “gender” countered that the ªnal
53. Oosterveld, supra note 48. Several delegates referred to the Beijing solution as a “non-deªnition.” Id.
54. On July 13, 1998, the Chair of the Working Group asked Canada and Chile to try to ªnd a solution with a small group of opposing countries. This led to a series of informal meetings—among supportive states, among opposing states, and between the two groups, in corridors and on the side of other
negotiations—outside the context of the Working Group. These are referred to in diplomatic parlance as
“informal informals.” Id.
55. Id.; see also Valerie Oosterveld, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Notes From
Informal Informal Discussions, July 13–14, 1998 (on ªle with author) [hereinafter Author’s Notes From
Informal Informal Discussions]; Summary Record of the 28th Meeting, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Court, Comm. of the Whole, 28th mtg., Agenda
Item 11, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.28 (1998) (statement of Kuwait to the Committee of the
Whole on July 28, 1998).
56. The ICC negotiations followed United Nations practice and worked by consensus. In consensus
negotiations, those who oppose something are usually in the better position to make gains toward their
position (by remaining intransigent), and those who support retention of something are forced to make
proposals and concessions in order to keep at least some of their ideas in the document, even if they represent the majority of views. As a result, the negotiation process creates strong pressures favoring “constructive ambiguity” over complexity, and the inherent complexity of the deªnition of “gender” was
reduced to two ideas: who was covered, and in what context? See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
57. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55; Steains, supra note 34, at 374
n.52.
58. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55. As an explanation of why they
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sentence should at least reºect the Beijing approach and read: “The term does
not imply any new meaning or connotation of the term different from accepted prior usage.”59
In the ªnal round of informal negotiations, references to “in the context of
their society” or “in the context of society and the traditional family unit”
were proposed by those opposed to “gender” but rejected as too restrictive by
those supportive of the term, while “in the context of society” was accepted
by both sides as having “sufªcient ºexibility as well as precision.”60 Those
opposed to “gender” then insisted that they required something further, and
the result was that the ªnal sentence used words that had been proposed before,
but written tautologically: “The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.” While an unusual solution, this sentence gave
comfort to those opposed to “gender” because they saw it as reafªrming the
“two sexes, male and female,” while those supportive felt that it was harmless because it reafªrmed the valuable sociological reference to “context of
society.” After further debate about how to incorporate the deªnition into
the Rome Statute, the delegates added the words “as deªned in article 7(3)”
after each reference to “gender” found in the Statute.
While many were surprised at the contentiousness of the debate on “gender” at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, there was precedent for this level
of disagreement. The Holy See, certain Arab states, and conservative organizations had earlier made their strong views on the term “gender” known in
other international fora, for example in the negotiations on the 1995 Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action. Following the adoption of that document, the Holy See stated that it understood the term “gender” “as grounded in
biological sexual identity, male or female” and thus excluding “dubious interpretations based on world views which assert that sexual identity can be
adapted indeªnitely to suit new and different purposes.”61 Certain conservainsisted on the reference to “two” sexes, some state representatives indicated that they feared that there
might be ªve or more genders. This refers to the “ªve genders” theory of the Christian Right, who believe that the goal of certain feminist activists is to give members of the human family ªve genders from
which to choose (male, female, homosexual, lesbian, or transgendered) instead of two (male or female).
Doris E. Buss, Finding the Homosexual in Women’s Rights: The Christian Right in International Politics, 6
Int’l Feminist J. Pol. 257, 569 (2004). This also refers to the “herm” (hermaphrodites), “ferm” (female
hermaphrodites), and “merm” (male pseudo hermaphrodites) argument used by conservative organizations in the Beijing Conference negotiations as a reason for “demanding assurance that only two sexes
would be recognized.” Sally Baden & Anne Marie Goetz, Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]?
Conºicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing, in Feminist Visions of Development: Gender Analysis
and Policy 19, 30 (Cecile Jackson & Ruth Pearson eds., 1998). These arguments were made in corridor
discussions and in “informal informal” negotiations.
59. Author’s Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55; Steains, supra note 34, at 374
n.53.
60. Steains, supra note 34, at 374.
61. Beijing Conference Addendum, supra note 52, at 164. The term “dubious interpretation” refers to
the Holy See’s opposition to sexuality that is not innate. Doris E. Buss, The Vatican and the Beijing
Conference on Women, 7 Soc. & Legal Studies 339, 348–49 (1998). The Holy See’s position was most
recently articulated in the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in
the Church and in the World (Holy See, Vatican), July 31, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.vatican.va/
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tive Catholic and Arab states and nongovernmental organizations also expressed similar positions during the Beijing negotiations62 and again in 1996 at
the Habitat World Conference.63
II. United Nations Approach to Deªning “Gender”
There are two approaches within the United Nations to deªning “gender.”
The ªrst is a minimalist approach taken at the multilateral (state-negotiated)
level. Prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute deªnition, states basically
left the term undeªned, either overtly or implicitly. “Gender” has been referred to without deªnition for over a decade in United Nations multilateral
human rights documents, such as the outcome documents of some U.N.
World Conferences64 and numerous resolutions from the Commission on
Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, and General Assembly.65 As
described above, the term “gender” was included in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action only after states agreed that the President of
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html.
62. Diane Otto, Lesbians? Not in My Country: Sexual Orientation and the Beijing World Conference on
Women, 20 Alternative L.J. 288, 89–290 (1995); Buss, supra note 61, at 354. Conservative NGOs
characterized “gender” as a “profoundly elastic term, encapsulating a broad feminist rights strategy that
includes abortion.” Doris Buss & Didi Herman, Globalizing Family Values: the Christian
Right in International Politics 113 (2003) (citing Austin Ruse, Feminists at U.N.: Seek Redeªnition
of Universal Human Rights, NewsMax.com, Nov. 13, 1998, at http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=
1998/11/13/63434). Buss and Herman point out that these groups fear that the term “gender” challenges
an essential “woman-ness” or “man-ness,” which leads to the erasure of “the two” sexes, with homosexuality as the inevitable outcome. Id. at 64.
63. This resulted in a footnote stating: “The statement on the commonly understood meaning of the
term ‘gender,’ presented at the Fourth World Conference on Women by the President of the Conference,
is reproduced in Annex V to the present report.” Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, Istanbul, Turkey, June 3–14, 1996, Annex I, ¶ 46, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.165/14 (Aug. 7, 1996), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/unchs/english/hagenda/ch3d.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Istanbul Declaration].
64. For example, note the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human
Rights, June 14–25, 1993, ¶¶ 18, 38, 42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993). Another example is the
Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for
Social Development, in Report of the World Summit for Social Development, World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen, Denmark, Mar. 6–12, 1995, Commitments 5, 6, 8, ¶¶ 7, 16, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29,
30, 36, 45, 47, 53, 56, 70, 73, 74, 77, 83, 91, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995). One exception to this
trend was the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, in Report of the World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban, S. Afr., Aug. 31–Sept. 8,
2001, at 5, 75, n.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2002) [hereinafter Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action], in which the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender” was included.
65. For examples of such statements from the General Assembly, see Comprehensive Implementation of
and Follow-Up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,
54th Sess., 58th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/78 (1998); Elimination of Domestic Violence Against
Women, G.A. Res. 58/147, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 110, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/147 (2004);
Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, G.A. Res. 48/108,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/108 (1994); Rights of the Child, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., 60th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/80 (1999);
Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations, U.N. ESCOR,
Substantive Sess. of 2004, Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. E/2004/L.35 (2004); Women in Development, G.A.
Res. 52/195, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/195 (1998).
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the Conference would make a statement indicating that the word “gender”
as used in the Platform for Action was intended to be interpreted and understood “in [its] ordinary, generally accepted usage” and that “there was no indication that any new meaning or connotation of the term, different from accepted
prior usage, was intended in the Platform for Action.”66 This same approach
was adopted the next year in the 1996 Habitat World Conference.67
The second approach to deªning “gender,” followed by the United Nations
and its agencies, is quite different. These institutions have adopted a number
of deªnitions of “gender,” some relatively detailed. While the deªnitions used
and promoted within various parts of the U.N. differ in focus and wording,
they all tend to emphasize three similar points: ªrst, “gender” is a socially
constructed concept; second, the construction of “gender” is complex and is
inºuenced by culture, the roles women and men are expected to play, the
relationships among those roles, and the value society places on those roles;
and third, the content of “gender” can vary within and among cultures, and
over time.
All U.N. deªnitions emphasize the fact that “gender” is a social construct,
and therefore is a learned rather than innate category. Different deªnitions
approach social construction in different ways. Certain U.N. deªnitions deªne
“gender” by contrasting it with “sex.” Of the two main U.N. deªnitions
that were in use at the time of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, both
took this approach. One, proposed in 1995, states: “The term ‘gender’ refers
to the ways in which roles, attitudes, values and relationships regarding
women and men are constructed by all societies all over the world. Therefore, while the sex of a person is determined by nature, the gender of that
person is socially constructed.”68 The second, included in the 1996 Report of
the Secretary-General on “Integrating the Human Rights of Women Throughout the United Nations System,” stated: “As sex refers to biologically determined differences between men and women that are universal, so gender
refers to the social differences between men and women that are learned,
changeable over time and have wide variations both within and between
cultures.”69 In 2002, the High Commissioner for Refugees issued inºuential
guidelines on international protection for gender-related persecution.70 These
66. Beijing Conference Addendum, supra note 52, Annex IV.
67. Istanbul Declaration, supra note 63, ¶ 46.
68. Report of the Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines for the Integration of Gender Perspectives into United Nations Human Rights Activities and Programmes, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,
52d Sess., Agenda Items 9, 21, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/105 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Report of the
Expert Group Meeting].
69. Integrating the Human Rights of Women Throughout the United Nations System: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/40 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Report of
the Secretary-General]. Similarly, a study submitted by the Secretary-General in 2002 deªned “gender” as
referring to “the socially constructed roles as ascribed to women and men, as opposed to biological and
physical characteristics.” Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security, U.N. SCOR, at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/1154 (2002).
70. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. High Comm’r for Refu-
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guidelines distinguish between “gender” and “sex,” deªning the former as
referring to “the relationship between women and men based on socially or culturally constructed and deªned identities, status, roles and responsibilities
that are assigned to one sex or another, while sex is a biological determination. Gender is not static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning over time.”71 Similarly, the Commission on Human Rights’
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has referred to “gender” as
“the socially constructed roles of women and men ascribed to them on the
basis of their sex.”72
Other U.N. deªnitions do not emphasize that “gender” is a social construct by contrasting “gender” with “sex.” Rather, they indicate that “gender” is built upon a biological foundation. For example, the World Bank
states that “[w]omen and men are different biologically but all cultures interpret and elaborate on these innate biological differences into a set of social
expectations about what behaviours and activities are appropriate, and what
rights, resources, and power they possess.”73 Some U.N. deªnitions do not
refer either to “sex” or biology, but instead focus on the social construction
of “gender.” For example, the deªnition adopted by the Ofªce of the Special
Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (“OSAGI”), which is
intended to assist the United Nations system in implementing gender mainstreaming throughout the U.N. system, states that “gender” “refers to the
social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female
and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as
relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through
socialization processes.”74 Deªnitions adopted by the World Health Organization (“WHO”),75 the U.N. Environment Programme,76 the U.N. Devel-

gees, at 1, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection] (“These Guidelines are meant to provide legal interpretive guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary as well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status determination in the ªeld.”).
71. Id. ¶ 3.
72. Review of Reports, Studies and Other Documentation for the Preparatory Comm. and the World Conference,
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, Geneva, Switzerland, July 30–Aug. 10, 2001, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.3/5 (2001) [hereinafter
Review of Reports].
73. World Bank, Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice, A World Bank Policy Research Report 2 (2001), available at
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_0102080
5393496 (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
74. OSAGI, Gender Mainstreaming, Concepts and Deªnitions, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/
conceptsandeªnitions.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). This deªnition is also used by the U.N. Mission
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“MONUC”). MONUC, at http://www.monuc.org/gender/
equality.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
75. See WHO, Gender and Reproductive Rights, Glossary, at http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/gender/glossary.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
76. See U.N. Environment Programme, Project Formulation, Approval, Monitoring and Evaluation Manual, at ch. 13.1, available at http://www.unep.org/Project_Manual/13.1.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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opment Fund for Women together with the U.N. Inter-Agency Project on
Human Trafªcking in the Mekong Sub-Region,77 the U.N. Development
Programme (“UNDP”),78 the International Labour Organization (“ILO”)
together with the South-East Asia and the Paciªc Multidisciplinary Team,79
and a 2003 expert group meeting sponsored by the U.N. Division for the
Advancement of Women, the Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, the
ILO, and UNDP also take this approach.80 Thus, the U.N. approach does
not follow any one feminist theory, with some U.N. deªnitions contrasting
“gender” and “sex” or “gender” and biology, and other deªnitions approaching “gender” as any social construction of male/female distinctions (in contrast to masculine/feminine distinctions).81
Many of the U.N. deªnitions of “gender” acknowledge that the construction of the term is strongly inºuenced by culture, which affects the roles women
and men are expected to play, the relationship among those roles, and the
value society places on those roles. For example, one deªnition states that
“[h]istorically, different cultures construct gender in different ways so that
women’s roles, the value that their society places on those roles, and the relationship with men’s roles may vary considerably over time and from one
setting to another.”82 Another deªnition recognizes that the understanding
of “gender” has “wide variations both within and between cultures.”83 Since
culture and society are so closely intertwined in the construction of the term,
the OSAGI deªnition notes that the concept of “gender” is part of “the
broader socio-cultural context.”84 Other deªnitions similarly link society,
culture, and sometimes political or economic context.85 Some deªnitions
77. See U.N. Development Fund for Women and the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human
Trafªcking in the Mekong Sub-Region, Trafªcking in Persons: A Gender and Rights Perspective, Brieªng Kit,
Sheet 4, at http://www.unifem-eseasia.org/resources/others/traffkit.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
78. See UNDP, Guide to Developing a UNDP Country Gender Brieªng Kit, at http://www.undp.org/
gender/docs/UNDP_Gender_Brieªng_Kit.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). The UNDP has also deªned
“gender” as referring to the “comparative or differential roles, responsibilities and opportunities for
women and men in a given society.” UNDP, Gender Mainstreaming Manual and Information Pack, at
http://www.undp.org/gender/docs/GM_INFOPACK/GMGlossary1.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
79. See ILO and South-East Asia and the Paciªc Multidisciplinary Advisory Team (“SEAPAT”), Online
Gender Learning Information Module, Unit 1, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/mdtmanila/
training/homepage/mainmenu.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
80. U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women, The Role of Men and Boys in Achieving Gender
Equality, Report of the Expert Group Meeting, at 14, n.2, U.N. Doc. EGM/MEN-BOYS-GE/2003/REPORT
(2004), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/men-boys2003/reports/Finalreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2003 Expert Group Meeting].
81. Baden & Goetz, supra note 58, at 29 (citing Laura Nicholson, Interpreting Gender, 29 Signs 79
(1994)).
82. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13. This deªnition deªnes “gender” from
the point of view of women, but most U.N. deªnitions deªne “gender” as it applies to both men and
women (sometimes also explicitly mentioning girls and boys). “Gender” should always be deªned as
applying to both women and men, in order not to conºate “gender” with “women” and therefore substantially narrow the deªnition of “gender.”
83. 1996 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 69, ¶ 10.
84. OSAGI, supra note 74.
85. 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14 n.4 (referring to gender norms as “[s]ocial and cultural expectations”); U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76 (noting that “gender” roles “change
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understand “gender” to be even more intersectional, and must be understood
as interacting with class, race, ethnicity, poverty level, sexual orientation,
and age.86 Inherent in these U.N. deªnitions is the understanding that those
who fall outside the accepted construction of “gender” may suffer varying
degrees of ostracism or other penalties in the societies in which they live.
Another important feature of many U.N. deªnitions is the recognition that
“gender” is a category that changes over time.87 Gender is not innate.88 While
some deªnitions note that at any given moment in time, gender norms are
often thought to be unchanging and representing tradition or natural difference between women and men,89 the World Bank deªnition states that gender asymmetries “can at times change quite rapidly in response to policy and
changing socioeconomic conditions.”90
At the multilateral level,91 states have generally avoided deªning “gender.”
This is because there is no consensus about the precise content of the term,
and there are widely differing, strongly held views on what the term should
and should not mean. Therefore, the term is usually left undeªned, either by
not including any explanation or by stating that the term is to be interpreted or
understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage. Two deviations from this
approach are the Rome Statute’s deªnition, and the replication of that deªnition
in the outcome document of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism.

from one place and culture and across time”); Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10 (stating that “gender”
depends on socio-economic, political, and cultural context); UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3 (referring to “socially or culturally constructed and deªned identities, status,
roles and responsibilities”); ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79 (noting that social differences between men
and women vary widely within and across cultures and treating “gender” as a “socio-economic variable
for analysing roles, responsibilities, constraints, opportunities, and needs of men and women”); WHO,
supra note 75 (referring to “economic, social and cultural attributes and opportunities associated with
being male and female in a particular point in time”).
86. Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10; OSAGI, supra note 74. The World Bank deªnition approaches the multi-dimensional nature of “gender” in a slightly different manner: “Like race, ethnicity
and class, gender is a social category that largely establishes one’s life chances, shaping one’s participation
in society and in the economy. Some societies do not experience racial or ethnic divides, but all societies
experience gender asymmetries—differences and disparities—to varying degrees,” World Bank, supra
note 73, at 24.
87. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13; 1996 Report of the Secretary-General,
supra note 69, ¶ 10; 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14, n.4; UNDP, supra note 78, at 17;
U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76; ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79; OSAGI, supra note 74;
WHO, supra note 75; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24.
88. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3 (stating that “[g]ender is not
static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning over time”).
89. 2003 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 80, at 14 n.4.
90. World Bank, supra note 73, at 24.
91. The examples above have focused on the United Nations. Other multilateral institutions have also
adopted deªnitions of “gender,” such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
“The term gender refers to the economic, social, political, and cultural attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female . . . . The nature of gender deªnitions (what it means to be male or
female) and patterns of inequality vary among cultures and change over time.” Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Comm., DAC Guidelines
for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation 12–13
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/46/28313843.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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By contrast, the United Nations has taken the opposite approach of deªning
“gender,” sometimes in substantial detail. While the deªnitions differ, they
generally stress the socially constructed nature of “gender” (sometimes contrasting it with the biologically determined nature of “sex”), they note the
complexity of this construction and the inºuence of culture, politics, economics, race, and other variables, and they identify the time and context of
“gender.”
III. Criticism of the Rome Statute’s Deªnition of “Gender”
The deªnition of “gender” included in the Rome Statute has garnered strong
criticism. While the criticism varies, there appear to be four main grounds
for concern relating to the perceived conºation of “gender” and “sex,” the
limitations of the reference to “context of society,” the potential exclusion of
sexual orientation from the deªnition of “gender,” and the sidelining of gender issues through the inclusion of a deªnition.
The Rome Statute’s deªnition begins with the statement: “For the purposes
of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes,
male and female.” Hilary Charlesworth views this sentence as deliberately confusing and as eliding “sex” and “gender.”92 She feels that the statement fails to
communicate that gender is a socially constructed set of assumptions regarding the roles of males and females.93 More pointedly, Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin argue that the phrase presents “gender” as an issue of biology
rather than social construction, and thus the deªnition has limited transformative edge.94 The deªnition does not draw attention to aspects of social
relations that are culturally contingent and without a foundation in biological necessity, as use of the term “gender” should do.95 Brenda Cossman refers to
the deªnition as a “stunningly narrow conception of gender.”96 She reads the
deªnition as being explicitly limited to the two biological sexes and states
that it is not even clear that the deªnition is intended to include the more
typical understanding of gender as socially constructed roles and values.97
Ruth Philips believes that the Rome Statute’s deªnition practically does not
distinguish between gender and sex, leaving little room for cultural construction of sex roles.98
Does the reference to the “two sexes, male and female” collapse “gender”
back into “sex”? The answer to this question is important because it will
92. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394; Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at
207.
93. Charlesworth, Feminist Methods, supra note 8, at 394.
94. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 335. Charlesworth has also said that the result of
such elision between “sex” and “gender” is a diminishing of the radical potential of both sexing and
gendering international law. Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at 207.
95. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 3.
96. Cossman, supra note 2, at 283.
97. Id. at 284.
98. Philips, supra note 8, at 234 n.14.
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determine what factors the ICC will consider in examining the crimes and
the needs of victims and witnesses. For example, if “gender” is no more than
“sex,” then the ICC would not be able to carry out the kind of analysis of
men’s and women’s roles that proved to be critical in the disposition of the
Krstic case in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.99 Similarly, the ICC would simply consider whether a victim or witness
was male or female, rather than also considering the social construction attached to “male” or “female” in a given society, which could result in insensitive
decisions about the protection or participation of the victim or witness.
Those opposed to the deªnition of “gender” pressed hard for a deªnition that
made “gender” mean the same thing as “sex,” because they feared that if it
did not, the baseline for interpreting the social construction of “gender”
would expand from male and female to either include ªve “genders” (adding
gay, lesbian, and transgendered) and/or include hermaphrodites, female
hermaphrodites, and male pseudo hermaphrodites.100 They were convinced
that if “male and female,” the number “two,” and the word “sex” were used,
biology would be the foremost factor in the deªnition.
However, the references to “two sexes” and “male and female” cannot strip
meaning from “gender” and render it equivalent to “sex,” because they are
linked to the phrase “within the context of society.” A far more straightforward interpretation of the “two sexes, male and female” is that it serves as a
signal to the ICC that the social construction of “gender” is to be interpreted
from a biological male/female foundation, just as a number of United Nations deªnitions of “gender” take “sex” as their starting point. A biological
foundation is quite different from biological determinism, unless taken to an extreme.
The ICC should not take, and should not be assumed to take, a biologically determinist position in deªning “gender,” for two reasons. First, while
the negotiating history does include a bloc that wished to ensure biological
determinism, that history also includes a larger bloc that wished to ensure
the opposite. The ICC will take that into account when considering the intent of the drafters.101 Second, given that there is no consensus among com99. In that case, the Tribunal examined the patriarchal nature of the Bosnian Muslim society in Srebrenica, and found that the Bosnian Serb forces were aware that destruction of a sizable number of men
would “inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica”
because these men would be ofªcially listed as missing and their spouses would be unable to remarry
(having ªdelity to a missing husband) and consequently, would not have new children, Prosecutor v.
Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, ¶ 93 nn.193 & 196, ¶ 595 (Aug. 2, 2001). “The
physical destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the community.” Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 30 (Apr. 19, 2004). While Krstic was
a case considering the crime of genocide, if “gender” was no more than “sex” under the ICC’s crimes
against humanity, then similar factual circumstances might result in the ICC overlooking that the surviving women were victims of persecution as much as the dead men were, because a socio-cultural analysis is
key to exposing this fact.
100. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
101. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC is required to apply applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law, including those on treaty interpretation. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
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mentators on the plain meaning of the “two sexes, male and female,” the
ICC is likely to also study “applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law”102 in formulating its understanding of gender. These treaties and laws include the principle of gender mainstreaming103 and the various deªnitions of “gender,” including those outlined above, which are a part
of international law. Many U.N. deªnitions take “sex” or biology as the starting
point from which to contrast “gender,” and upon which the socially constructed understandings of “male” and “female” are built.104
Within feminist theory, including feminist theory of international law,
there are evolving and differing views on the nature of “sex” and “gender.”
These differing views explain certain aspects of the criticism of the Rome
Statute deªnition, especially of the phrase “two sexes, male and female.”
Judith Butler argues that the “construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed
as gender.”105 If this is so, then “sex” is not a place from which to contrast
“gender” or a platform upon which the social construction of “gender” can
be built. The U.N.-style approach outlined above does not take the social
construction of “sex” into account. This, according to Cossman, means that
the deªnition of “gender” at the international level loses its “subversive”
possibilities and instead becomes narrowly conceived.106 Is it possible that
the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender” encompasses Cossman’s approach,
such that a reading of “sex” is also socially constructed? The possibility of
interpreting the Statute with “sex” understood as a socially constructed concept cannot be ruled out, given that the “two sexes” of the Rome Statute deªnition are themselves potentially subject to “the context of society.” However,
the deªnition seems to fall heavily on the side of the “sex”-as-a-startingpoint approach taken by the U.N., given a plain reading of the deªnition,
the negotiation history, and the precedent provided by various U.N. deªnitions.
Following this approach, the ICC may examine the preparatory work of the Rome Statute and the circumstances of its conclusion, if an interpretation “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” still leaves
the meaning “ambiguous or obscure.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, arts. 31, 32, Hein’s No. KAV 2424, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. It is highly likely that the ICC will
need to consider the preparatory work in order to fully understand and interpret the deªnition of “gender.”
102. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(b).
103. See Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the
United Nations, in this Volume.
104. See 1995 Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13; 1996 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
69, ¶ 10; Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10; UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra
note 70, art. I, ¶ 3; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24.
105. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 7 (1990).
106. See Cossman, supra note 2, at 284. By subversive possibilities, she means its ability to trouble and
challenge the inevitability of the relationship between gender and sex, and the interpretations that ºow
from a delinking of these constructs that might “disrupt and fragment the dominant cultural narrative.”
See id. at 282–83. Charlesworth and Chinkin raise a related point: “If we attend to the constitutive role of
the law and society in forming the ‘naturally’ sexed person, the concepts of ‘sex’ and ‘biological difference’ can be seen to have constructed, contingent and political elements,” with the major difference
between “sex” and “gender” being “their focus on different elements of dichotomies such as body/mind
and nature/culture.” Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 3–4.
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Cossman’s concerns are therefore validated. Even so, this fact is unlikely to
have any practical effect on the ICC’s work as the word “sex” will always be
considered by the Court in the context of the “gender” deªnition and not on
its own, since it is not used elsewhere in the Statute.
The second criticism of the deªnition raised by some authors is that the
phrase “within the context of society” limits what the ICC can understand
gender to mean, and therefore may limit the ICC’s consideration of the full
range of factors affecting the social construction of gender. If this were true,
then the ICC might not be able to examine certain factors related to how a
society constructs “gender,” such as a strong cultural emphasis on marriage
and female virginity at marriage, or societal viliªcation of gay men. If the
ICC cannot examine these factors, then it will not be able to understand and
evaluate adequately the effects of rape on a female victim who is deemed unmarriageable by her society, or on a man (whatever his sexual orientation) raped
by another man in a homophobic society. Cossman argues that the phrase “in
the context of society” is unclear and may be narrower than the typical view
that “gender” involves socially constructed roles.107 The Special Rapporteur
on Violence Against Women characterizes the deªnition as preventing approaches that rely on the social construction of gender.108 Not all commentators agree, however. Barbara Bedont, Katherine Hall Martinez, Rhonda
Copelon, and Machteld Boot read the phrase “context of society” as incorporating a sociological or social construction of gender.109 The Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery interpreted the deªnition to be “consistent with other, more clearly stated formulations” adopted within the United
Nations,110 which would include the socially and culturally sensitive deªnitions
outlined above.
There is no denying the fact that the phrase “within the context of society” is not as clear as language found in, for example, U.N. deªnitions of
“gender,” including “socially constructed,”111 “constructed by all societies,”112
“socially deªned,”113 and “social differences.”114 Even so, the phrase “context
of society” is not very different from the language found in the U.N. deªnitions. The phrase “within the context of society” was chosen to give ICC
judges the ºexibility to determine the meaning of the phrase on a case-bycase basis,115 which the U.N. deªnitions also encourage. In so doing, and in

107. Cossman, supra note 2, at 284.
108. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 10, ¶ 19.
109. Copelon, supra note 5, at 236–37; Bedont & Hall Martinez, supra note 11, at 3; Boot, supra note
11, at 172.
110. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, supra note 11, ¶ 26.
111. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 10; Review of Reports, supra note 72, ¶ 10;
OSAGI, supra note 74; UNDP, supra note 78, at 17; World Bank, supra note 73, at 24.
112. 1995 Report of the Expert Group Meeting, supra note 68, ¶ 13.
113. U.N. Environment Programme, supra note 76.
114. ILO and SEAPAT, supra note 79.
115. Steains, supra note 34, at 374.
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accordance with article 21, the ICC will need to create a set of signiªers of
context such as those found in the U.N. deªnitions outlined above: roles
(including the relationship between and among men’s and women’s roles),
attitudes, values, attributes, expectations, status, opportunities, socialization
processes, responsibilities assigned, rights, resources, and power, as determined and/or expected within a society or culture at any given time and
place, and as affected by race, class, sexual orientation, poverty level, ethnic
group, age, and other factors. The end result is that “context of society” necessarily implicates the same factors as “socially constructed,” and therefore
allows the ICC to consider a wide range of crucial factors involved in understanding “gender” within a society.
In addition, while judges are to consider the “context of society,” this does
not mean that they must defer to the context, a fear that seems to underlie some
of the commentators’ concerns. When the ICC judges and Prosecutor are
considering the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution, the
ICC’s Elements of Crimes document requires that the deªnition of “gender”
be evaluated in light of the acts and perception of the accused. The accused
may try to rely on state- or society-supported misogynist or homophobic reasoning to excuse his actions. For example, an accused may try to excuse his
crimes as being dictated by the kind of propaganda campaign that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda described as taking place prior to
and during the 1994 genocide, in which Tutsi women were presented as sexual
objects.116 However, this defense would not be successful because the reference to “within the context of society” does not require the ICC’s Prosecutor
and judges to situate themselves within, and potentially accept, a misogynist or homophobic framework in order to determine whether “gender” was
the basis for persecution.117 Similarly, if a society deªnes “gender” narrowly,
this cannot negatively alter how the ICC provides victim and witness protection or participation, or how the Prosecutor undertakes his or her duties
with respect to a certain situation. The Prosecutor, Registrar, and judges
must not only examine the context of the society in which the crime took
place (and how the perpetrator viewed that context), but must also interpret
Eventually, the language “within the context of society” was settled upon, with delegations on
both sides of the issue satisªed that there was sufªcient ºexibility as well as precision inherent
in the sentence. This effectively leaves the term open for the future Court to interpret and apply to the circumstances before it, as appropriate . . . . At the same time, the reference to
“within the context of society” satisªed those delegations that wanted the deªnition to encapsulate the broader sociological aspects of the term, along the lines of earlier deªnitions.
Id.
116. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 732 (Sept. 2, 1998).
117. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Court, art. 7(1)(h), U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). In fact, the reliance on such propaganda can serve as proof that the
“perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such,” id. at 15, and that the “perpetrator knew that the conduct was
part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population,” id.
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and apply the deªnition of “gender” in light of international law.118 The
“society” considered in the Rome Statute’s deªnition is not only domestic,
but also international.119 A helpful corollary is found in international refugee law, which considers both the domestic and international social construction of “gender.”120
The third criticism leveled at the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” is
that it appears to preclude the ICC from interpreting sexual orientation as
included within “gender.” (This is actually a subset of the second concern;
namely, that the ICC will not be able to consider one important aspect in
the social construction of “gender”: the social understanding of sexual identity.) Charlesworth and Philips both take the view that the deªnition deliberately reºects the concern of Arab states and the Holy See that any reference
to “gender” might be understood to include sexual orientation.121 While
they do not explicitly conclude that sexual orientation is therefore excluded
from the deªnition of “gender” (although Philips calls the approach “regressive”122), Rana Lehr-Lehnardt does, stating that “gender means male and
female, not homosexual” and that “homosexual provisions are excluded.”123
Stephanie Farrior also assumes that “[d]ebates in Rome resulted in the
[Rome Statute] adopting a limiting deªnition to ensure that persecution on
the basis of sexual orientation would not be covered.”124 Cossman correctly
notes that conservative states locked onto the concept of “gender” as potentially subversive because it includes consideration of sexual identity.125 She
concludes that, as a result of conservative pressure, the ICC’s deªnition excludes protections for “gender outlaws.”126 Like Charlesworth, Cossman fears
that the ICC negotiators missed an opportunity to remap the margins or

118. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
119. International refugee law provides some assistance in this regard. While refugee law is statebased, it is not aimed at holding states responsible: its function is remedial. James Hathaway, New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection, 8 J. Refugee Stud.
288, 293 (1995). Refugee status is determined based on the story told by the claimant, and is often based
on a fear created by an individual or and individual’s actions toward the claimant. When this is the case,
refugee law accepts that the claimant may or may not deªne “gender” for him/herself in a particular way,
but that the aggressor does deªne “gender”—and has acted upon that deªnition—in a manner that
causes a well-founded fear of persecution in the claimant. Of course, the claimant may consciously choose
to act outside of the constraints imposed by her culture’s deªnition of gender; in this case, “whatever
cultural consensus exists, refugee law protects an individual who wishes to dissociate herself from that
consensus, asserting that her choice is in line with international standards.” Deborah E. Anker, Refugee
Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 133, 145 (2002).
120. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3; see also supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
121. Charlesworth, Proceedings, supra note 42, at 207; Philips, supra note 8, at 233 n.14.
122. Philips, supra note 8, at 233 n.14.
123. Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 6, at 340, 351.
124. Farrior, supra note 2, at 598.
125. Cossman, supra note 2, at 284.
126. Id. at 289; see also Brenda Cossman, The Gender of International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Third
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 93 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 206, 208 (1999).
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boundaries of international law,127 rethink “gender,” and engage with both
the limits and possibilities of agency, including sexual agency.128
The views assuming that sexual orientation is excluded from the deªnition of
“gender” are arguably incorrect. First, as Copelon notes, the “words do not
support an exclusion of sexual orientation.”129 Indeed, as Cate Steains correctly recalls, there was no consensus as to whether the deªnition of “gender” should include sexual orientation.130 This lack of consensus “effectively
leaves the term open for the Court to interpret and apply to the circumstances
before it, as appropriate.”131 Some seem to read the ªnal sentence of the Rome
Statute deªnition as implicitly precluding “gender” from encompassing sexual orientation.132 But the text does not say this and, as Bedont, Hall Martinez, and Copelon have stated, many view this last sentence as tautological
and superºuous133 because it simply refers the reader back to the ªrst sentence.
This analysis is defensible under general principles of treaty interpretation,
according to which the ICC would examine the ordinary meaning of the words
of the second sentence,134 which say that the ªrst sentence does not have any
meaning other than what it means.135

127. Cossman, supra note 2, at 291.
128. Id. at 293–94.
129. Copelon, supra note 5, at 237.
130. E-mail from Cate Steains, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations in New York,
to Valerie Oosterveld, Legal Ofªcer, Foreign Affairs Canada (Jan. 22, 2004) (on ªle with author). This
would include no consensus on whether the ICC can consider the crime against humanity of persecution
based on sexual orientation, whether the ICC is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation in the application and interpretation of law, whether the Prosecutor should, in hiring an
adviser, consider whether that person has expertise in issues related to sexual orientation, and whether
ICC ofªcials would need to consider sexual orientation when addressing the needs of victims and witnesses.
131. Steains, supra note 34.
132. This misperception stems in part from an unfortunate editorial change to Steains’ chapter in The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute—Issues, Negotiations,
Results. Id. Language was inserted by the editor without her permission that stated that the second
sentence in the deªnition of “gender” was “ultimately included to forestall any implication that the issue
of sexual orientation could be raised in connection with article 7(3).” E-mail from Cate Steains, supra note
130. This sentence had originally read: “The second sentence was included upon the insistence of the
‘anti-gender’ delegations, despite arguments by the ‘pro-gender’ delegations that it was superºuous.” Id.
133. Bedont & Hall Martinez, supra note 11, at 203; Copelon, supra note 5, at 237.
134. Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 188 (2000).
135. While the ICC might stop at consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, it might not
consider that clear enough and would go on to consider the context, which would include the preambular
reminder of the “unimaginable atrocities” that occurred over the past century and afªrmations that the
ICC will address most serious crimes of concern to the international community. Id. at 188–91. See also
Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. ¶¶ 4, 9. The “unimaginable atrocities” would include the extermination of homosexuals during World War II. The ICC would also likely consider the preparatory work on
the Rome Statute, in which those supportive of an inclusive deªnition of “gender” asked that the term
“not imply any new meaning or connotation of the term different from accepted prior usage.” Author’s
Notes From Informal Informal Discussions, supra note 55. This was in response to a proposal by those
opposed to the term “gender” that the deªnition state that “[t]he term does not imply the existence of
more than two sexes.” Id. As a completely different text was adopted, the sentence does not imply either.
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Second, Copelon convincingly argues that it is “dubious to argue that any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of discrimination.”136 The right to
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has been recognized by
various United Nations treaty committees.137 Third, conceptions of “gender”
and sexual orientation are inextricably linked. Violence against women or
men based on cultural deªnitions of “appropriate maleness” or “femaleness”
is intimately intertwined with violence against individuals based on sexual
orientation.138 The concept of “gender,” especially in the context of genderbased persecution, must be broad enough to capture any group challenging
traditionally deªned gender roles—not only groups deªned by sexual orientation, but also individuals who violate norms of gender conformity through
their dress and other social, non-sexual forms of expression, such as transgendered individuals.139 Women and those who attempt to transcend societal gender role expectations often ªght against similar opponents for similar
underlying reasons.140 Under international refugee law, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees has recognized that gender-based persecution
includes discrimination against homosexuals.141
While there are strong arguments against an assumed exclusion of sexual
orientation from the deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute, some might
argue that it does not matter whether “gender” includes sexual orientation
136. Copelon, supra note 5, at 237.
137. The Human Rights Committee, like several other U.N. Committees, has issued a number of
concluding observations on the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Report of
the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (1996);
Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 279, U.N. Doc.
A/52/40 (1997); Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
¶ 190, 216, 256, 356, 375, U.N. Doc. A/54/40 (1999); Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. I, U.N.
GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 247, 248, 309, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (2000); Report of the Human
Rights Committee, Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, ¶ 72(11), U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (2001).
The Human Rights Committee ruled that the references to “sex” in the Covenant’s non-discrimination
clauses (articles 2(1) and 26) are to be read as including sexual orientation. Report of the Human Rights
Committee, Vol. II, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 235, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994). In addition, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has issued a General Comment that states
that the Covenant proscribes discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Report on the TwentyEighth and Twenty-Ninth Sessions, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 2,
at 125, U.N. Doc. E/2003/22 (2003). Many of these views and decisions are based on an interpretation of
“sex” as including sexual orientation, since the term “gender” is not used in the International Covenants
on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights due to their age. However, read
alongside contemporaneous interpretations by the U.N. of “gender,” these decisions and statements
provide support for the view that nondiscrimination on the basis of “gender” includes non-discrimination
on the basis of sexual identity.
138. See James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence:
An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 989, 990–91 (1997) (stating that violence against sexual minorities reºects common gendered assumptions and mechanisms that foster the
violence).
139. Cf. id. at 1006–07 (arguing that oppression based on sexual orientation or identity involves oppression not only against gays and lesbians because of their sexual orientation, but also oppression against
those whose conduct challenges traditional gender norms).
140. Id. at 1007.
141. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 70, ¶ 3; see also Wilets, supra note
138, at 1046 n.237.
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because sexual orientation can be addressed through other avenues. For example, sexual orientation could be included under “other status” in the article on the application and interpretation of applicable law,142 as was done by
certain states following the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action.143 Sexual orientation could possibly be considered in the crime
against humanity of persecution, through the phrase “or any other grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”144
In addition, the Prosecutor could hire an adviser with expertise on sexual
orientation issues, and the Court and the Prosecutor could consider the sexual orientation of victims and witnesses in making decisions on investigations, prosecutions, and protection, because the considerations in the relevant
articles are open-ended and not exhaustive.145 These arguments may provide
alternative or additional ways of including sexual orientation in the Rome
Statute, but the fact remains that a consideration of the construction of
“gender” would not be complete without an evaluation of whether the collective norms in a society understand “femaleness” and “maleness” only to
include heterosexuality, or to include different sexual identities.146 In some
cases the expectations of heterosexuality are so prevalent that they are fundamental to the interpretation of other aspects of “gender.” For example, perpetrators may choose to persecute groups of women using rape because they
expect that the women will then be considered “deªled” and therefore unmarriageable by the men in their society.
Buried within the concern about potential exclusion of sexual orientation
from the deªnition of “gender” is the separate concern that the ICC will
conºate “sex,” “gender,” and “sexual orientation.”147 This could work in two
ways: “gender” could be conºated with “sexual orientation” such that an analy142. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(3).
143. Otto, supra note 62, at 290. See also Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 41, at 164–65 (showing
that Israel submitted a statement to the Conference stating that it interprets the words “other status” as
including sexual orientation).
144. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h). However, note the high threshold of “universally recognized.”
145. The Rome Statute empowers the Prosecutor to appoint advisers with legal expertise on speciªc
issues in article 42(9) and mandates that the Prosecutor will take the nature of the crime into account in
order to ensure effective investigation and prosecution of crimes in article 54(1)(b), while article 68(1)
states that the Court will take appropriate steps to protect the wellbeing of victims and witnesses by
taking into account all relevant factors. Id. arts. 42(9), 54(1)(b), 68(1).
146. Some might argue that the ICC has demonstrated that it understands “femaleness” and “maleness” as only including heterosexuality, insofar as it has chosen to list separately “sexual orientation” and
“gender” as grounds upon which counsel cannot discriminate against others. Proposal for a Draft Code of
Professional Conduct for Counsel before the International Criminal Court, Presidency of the Int’l Crim. Court,
art. 9(1), U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/3/11/Rev.1 (2004). The opposite argument might also be made that the
ICC views sexual orientation as linked to and part of the term “gender,” but felt the need to ensure clear
guidance in the Code and so named them separately. Given that the ICC’s Registry drafted the Code at a
time when the ICC was still in its establishment phase, it is doubtful that the draft Code represents a
speciªc policy on whether sexual orientation forms part of the deªnition of “gender” or not.
147. For an analysis of the conºation of these three concepts in domestic law, see Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conºation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
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sis of “gender” begins and ends with an analysis of sexual orientation. This
would limit the Court’s understanding of “gender” to only one facet of many
that could be considered. This could lead the ICC to overlook cases of gender-based persecution that do not (overtly) involve elements of sexual orientation, such as targeting all male children for extermination because they
could eventually become soldiers. This is not a likely scenario given the need
for the ICC to evaluate the “context of society” and all of its attendant indicators outlined above. The second way this triple conºation could work is
that “sexual orientation” could be collapsed into either “sex” or “gender,”
with the end result that the ICC equates “sexual orientation” with heterosexuality.148 In other words, commentators are concerned that the ICC will
fall into a trap of heteronormativity. While this concern stems from the negotiation history, in which conservative states pressed for the reference to
“two sexes” in an unsuccessful attempt to collapse “gender” back into biology, it also stems from feminist critiques arguing that “sex” is a socially constructed concept and questioning the link between the assumption that there
are only two sexes and therefore two areas of evaluating “gender”—masculinity
and femininity—and, implicitly, sexual identity.149 This triple conºation
could cause problems if the ICC assumed in any given context that biological sex and/or gender dictated a person’s sexuality, thereby overlooking potential grounds for persecution. The ICC therefore must be alert to avoid
conºating “sex” and/or “gender” with “sexual orientation,” even though there
are no textual clues (as there are in the differentiation of “sex” and “gender”)
within the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender.”
Finally, some commentators fear that the fact that “gender” is deªned in
the Rome Statute when other equally crucial terms are not suggests that gender
issues will remain sidelined within international criminal justice. According
to Jocelyn Campanaro, the very fact that “gender” is deªned and other key
terms are not reºects a devaluation of gendered harms.150 She is concerned
that gender-based crimes will not receive equal attention as a result,151
probably because the deªnition is too narrow or because the ICC will be less
inclined to prosecute or convict on the basis of an opaque deªnition. Similarly, Brook Sari Moshan feels that the Rome Statute inappropriately qualiªes

148. This seems to be Cossman’s concern. She states that although a rigid deªnition of “gender” may
allow the problems of women to become visible in international law, it may cause “multiple other subjectivities constructed in and through gender to remain beyond the margins,” Cossman, supra note 2, at
289. She also states that homosexuals are among those that such a deªnition may leave beyond the margins. Id.
149. For example, some feminist scholars have described “sex” as containing “constructed, contingent
and political elements.” Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 4 (citing Margaret Davies, Taking
the Inside Out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject, in Sexing the Subject of Law, 25 (Ngaire Nafªne &
Rosemary J. Owens eds., 1997)).
150. See Jocelyn Campanaro, Women, War, and International Law: The Historical Treatment of GenderBased War Crimes, 89 Geo. L.J. 2557, 2591 (2001).
151. See id.
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the term “gender” and considers the deªnition a “failure.”152 She believes that
the deªnition will complicate the prosecution of gender-based crimes as it is
unworkable and impractical.153 She fears that the deªnition of “gender” implies that gender-based persecution is different from other forms of persecution and therefore will be perceived by the ICC’s judges as “somehow less
grave.”154
Campanaro and Moshan’s concerns are understandable, given many failures in the past to prosecute fully, or prosecute at all, gender-based crimes.155
However, much comfort can be found in the arguments above on the nature
of the deªnition of “gender” and in the administrative structure of the ICC
set out in the Statute. Under this structure, the Prosecutor must appoint
advisers with legal expertise on sexual and gender violence156 and must take
appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of
crimes, taking into account whether the crimes involve gender violence.157
These steps were speciªcally included to ensure that gender-based crimes are
not sidelined or ignored.158 The Prosecutor has, in fact, highlighted genderbased crimes in his statements relating to the investigation underway in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.159
IV. Conclusion
It is unfortunate that “gender” was singled out in the Rome Statute negotiations and ultimately accorded a “peculiar and circular” deªnition.160 A
large number of delegations wished to leave the term undeªned, just as the
terms “political,” “racial,” “national,” “ethnic,” “cultural,” and “religious”
were left undeªned in the crime against humanity of persecution, and as
“age,” “race,” “colour,” “language,” “religion or belief,” “political or other
opinion,” “national, ethnic, or social origin,” “wealth,” “birth,” and “other
status” remain undeªned in article 21(3) on the application of the law without adverse distinction. Once it became clear that the only solution was to
adopt a deªnition, both sides in the “gender” debate would have preferred a
deªnition that more clearly articulated their positions. As is often the case in
international negotiations, states sought refuge in constructive ambiguity,161
152. Moshan, supra note 3, at 178.
153. See id. at 178, 182.
154. Id. at 183.
155. For examples of failures to prosecute fully gender-based crimes, see Judith G. Gardam & Michelle J. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conºict and International Law 205, 222, 227 (2001).
156. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(9).
157. Id. art. 54(1)(b).
158. Steains, supra note 34, at 385, 390.
159. Press Release, The Int’l Crim. Court, The Ofªce of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/
pressreleases/26.html (“The reports allege a pattern of rape, torture, forced displacement and the illegal
use of child soldiers.”).
160. Copelon, supra note 5, at 236.
161. Aust, supra note 134, at 184. Aust describes the pressures that lead to the use of constructive

82

Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 18

leaving much of the decision-making on the content of the deªnition to the
ICC’s judges (and, where provided for in the Statute, the Prosecutor and Registrar).
Since the interpretation of “gender” is left with the ICC itself, there are
very real concerns by many commentators that the ICC will choose a narrow
and regressive reading of the “gender” deªnition. This could have ramiªcations
not only for how the ICC addresses certain crimes, applicable law and victims and witnesses, but also on the theorization of “gender” in international
law more generally. While there is no guarantee that the ICC will go down
such a negative path, there are many clear and positive guideposts pointing
the ICC in a more progressive direction. If the ICC follows the more progressive path, many of the current concerns will appear overstated. A plain
reading of the Rome Statute’s text and an interpretation based on U.N.
deªnitions of “gender” support a differentiation between “sex” and “gender,”
rather than a conºation of the two terms. The ICC will likely understand
“context of society” as equal to “socially constructed” and draw its list of
indicators of “context of society” from existing U.N. deªnitions of “gender”
which are broad, multifaceted, and cross-cutting. While the ICC must consider the “context of society,” it cannot defer to a misogynist or homophobic
context. Additionally, the negotiation history and a plain reading of the
Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” demonstrate that “sexual orientation”
is not explicitly excluded from “gender.” In addition, international law is
increasingly recognizing “sexual orientation” as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Finally, the administrative structure provided for in the Rome
Statute directs the Prosecutor to adopt a strong focus on gender-based
crimes, resulting in a thorough review of such crimes by the ICC’s judges.
Therefore, while one cannot predict with certainty that the ICC will avoid
the pitfalls identiªed by Cossman, Charlesworth, the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, and others, there are strong indicators that the
ICC will take a path that beneªts gender justice at the ICC, and international law more generally.162
The criticisms of the Rome Statute’s deªnition of “gender” highlight the
fact that the term is undertheorized in international law. The fact that the
Rome Statute leaves the ICC to give content to the term “gender” creates an
important opportunity for international lawyers to focus more squarely on
the meaning of the term. Increased theorization (at a general level and in the

ambiguity. “For multilateral treaties, the greater the number of negotiating states, the greater is the need
for imaginative and subtle drafting to satisfy competing interests. The process inevitably produces much
wording which is unclear or ambiguous.” Id.
162. On the other hand, not all states have the same reasons to follow these international guideposts
when interpreting the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution in the domestic context.
States might decide to enforce their own restrictive views of “gender,” for example by excluding persecution on the basis of sexual orientation. The ICC can overcome this by deeming such action to represent
“unwillingness” under what is commonly referred to as the doctrine of complementarity found in article
17 of the Rome Statute.
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context of the Rome Statute) can play a critical role in ensuring broad and
productive interpretations of the term by the ICC. Increased theorization
may mean transporting theories on the deªnition of “gender” from other contexts (the domestic legal context and others) and examining their applicability to international law generally, as well as to speciªc areas of international
law such as international human rights, humanitarian, criminal, and refugee
law.163 It may also mean creating a new set of understandings, and would
very likely include a great deal of ºuidity. A focus on theorizing “gender”
will likely lead to a number of international legal approaches, just as there
are a number of ever-evolving feminist approaches in other areas.
The deªnition of “gender” in the Rome Statute should not automatically
be replicated in other international law documents. This is easier said than
done in the context of international consensus negotiations, in which an unequal power structure privileges those countries rejecting proposals (even when
they are a small minority), and in which debates on “gender” are sometimes
unfortunately characterized as “distractions” from the “main issues.”164 Add
in the pressures of domestic, religious, and other politics and negotiators
may view the Rome Statute deªnition as a “quick ªx” to resolve a crisis. This
is what happened in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action of
the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.165 While the Rome Statute’s deªnition is
broad and ºexible enough to ensure a positive and sensitive interpretation
by the ICC’s Prosecutor, Registrar, and judges, its text is also spare and circular. Future documents can and should strive for a better-drafted and clearer
approach, even if the text is essentially left similarly open to construction (this
provides the opportunity for increased theorization of the term “gender”). To
achieve this, states supportive of a sensitive and forward-looking use of the
term “gender” must plan ahead, work together during negotiations, and act
as a cohesive bloc. Again, this is easier prescribed than followed, as there
would ªrst need to be consensus among a group of states as to some of the
basic content of “gender,” even when there is no agreement within the feminist community on the same point. However, such coordination is essential
to ensure that states do not approach deªning “gender” progressively in an
ad-hoc manner—as if opposition to the term always comes as a surprise—but
rather approach such a deªnition as a strategic goal.
163. See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7.
164. In the author’s experience, some have viewed the debate on the term “gender” as overly confrontational (and emotional) within a U.N. context that works on the basis of consensus. It is true that such
debates tend to become polarized and are used as a tactic by those wishing to restrict or eliminate the use
of the term. However, a debate can be helpful for international law if chaired, moderated, or guided by a
skillful person who understands the issues, both stated and unstated.
165. Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 64. A note appended to the document
states: “For the purpose of this Declaration and Programme of Action, it was understood that the term
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does
not indicate any meaning different from the above.” Id. at 75. The term “gender” is mentioned in eighteen paragraphs in the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
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The Rome Statute deªnition does not transform international law from
understanding “gender” in one way to understanding it a different way.166 In
this sense, the deªnition in the Rome Statute represents a missed opportunity to remap the boundaries of international law.167 Practically speaking, it
probably was never possible to make a dramatic shift, given the dynamics of
the negotiation. The result, however, is broad enough to allow the ICC to
interpret the deªnition to reºect the approaches taken within the United
Nations, including nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and
avoid regression in the law. It is also enough of an empty vessel that increased
attention to the theories of “gender” by international lawyers could also have
a signiªcant and positive impact on the content of “gender” within international law.

166. For this reason, the Rome Statute deªnition of “gender” is thus not transformative. Cossman, supra note 2, at 283; Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 335.
167. Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 7, at 335.

